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EXHAUSTION AND THE LIMITS OF REMOTE-CONTROL
PROPERTY
MOLLY SHAFFER VAN HOUWELING t
ABSTRACT
In this Article I argue that intellectual property (IP) exhaustion
should be understood against the backdrop of a long history of skepti-
cism toward what I call "remote-control" property rights. IP is not the
only field of law that gives remote rights-holders the ability to constrain
the behavior of other people to use things in their rightful possession.
Tangible property law-in particular the law of servitudes-features
similar mechanisms, but hems them in with doctrinal limitations. Look-
ing to this body of law helps us more clearly to recognize remote-control
property's benefits and costs and, thus, to articulate a rationale for IP
exhaustion as a limitation on remote-control IP. At the same time, re-
mote-control IP is special. Restrictions on the use of works of creativity
and invention have implications for the promotion of progress of science
and the useful arts. It is especially important that such restrictions not be
ratcheted up solely at the whim of IP owners attaching labels to embodi-
ments of their works. Nor should such restrictions be left solely to gener-
ally applicable commercial law without regard to IP's special policy con-
cerns. Instead, courts and Congress should continue to absorb the wis-
dom of the common law of tangible property while crafting an IP-
specific exhaustion policy that is attentive to the specific costs and bene-
fits of remote-control IP.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of intellectual property (IP) exhaustion is rightly informed
by a long history of skepticism toward what I call "remote-control prop-
erty rights." Property rights that give owners the ability to control how
other people use assets in their rightful possession are potentially confus-
ing, subject to obsolescence, and sometimes burdensome to third parties.
In some cases, these costs can be mitigated in ways that make remote-
control property rights beneficial on balance. The evolution of the law of
land servitudes-which can be very useful tools for long term land-use
planning-demonstrates this possibility. By contrast, longstanding judi-
cial hostility toward personal property servitudes suggests that remote
control is not always reasonable.
So what about remote-control IP? The entire logic of this field of
law is based on the notion that remote-control property rights can be
worthwhile. Every copyright and patent gives its owner some ability to
control the use of objects possessed by other people. It prevents posses-
sors of books from reproducing their pages, for example. The theory of
IP is that the advantages of this control, in the form of incentives for au-
thorship and invention that promote progress, outweigh the disad-
vantages. But IP rights are limited. And one of those limitations, the doc-
trine of exhaustion, operates to constrain the reach of an IP owner's re-
mote control over other people's tangible property.
Generally speaking, exhaustion allows owners of tangible objects
embodying IP to use those objects in ways that do not produce additional
copies or new works; owners may also transfer the objects they own to
others. These activities can benefit tangible property owners, and the
property system as a whole, without cutting to the core of IP owners'
need to limit ruinous competition. IP exhaustion can thus be understood
to maintain IP's balance between remote-control property's benefits and
costs.
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This balance is often described as one between the rights of IP own-
ers and the personal property rights of the owners of tangible things. The
purpose of exhaustion, on this view, is to ensure that IP owners' rights do
not unduly interfere with the freedom from remote control that owners of
personal property would have in the absence of IP. A variation of this
view holds that exhaustion defines the "statutory domain" of IP, ensuring
that this specialized statutory body of law does not interfere unnecessari-
ly with generally applicable commercial law.' Proponents of both of the-
se views typically suggest that owners of objects embodying IP (e.g.,
books) should be treated, to the greatest extent possible, the same as
owners of objects that do not embody IP (e.g., doorstops).
Here I begin to articulate a third view: exhaustion does not merely
ensure that owners of books have most of the same rights as owners of
doorstops. In some important cases, it should ensure that owners of
books have more rights than owners of doorstops. The premise of IP is
that books are more important than doorstops. It is thus more important
that they be used instead of wasted, preserved instead of destroyed, read
with autonomy instead of surveilled, and built upon instead of ignored.
Although my focus here will be on copyright, much the same is true for
objects embodying patented inventions. In both cases, IP exhaustion can
be deployed to give owners of these special objects immunity from the
kind of remote control that would constrain the objects' use and diminish
their value.
I start with an abridged history of the law and policy of servitudes,
explaining how these forms of remote-control property have been some-
what reluctantly enforced when applied to land and largely resisted when
applied to chattels. This section explains how concerns about notice and
information costs, "dead-hand control," and the "problem of the future,"
and negative externalities have shaped this evolving body of law. It then
explains the historical, doctrinal, and theoretical links between resistance
to chattel servitudes and intellectual property exhaustion. Next it reviews
several recent strands of scholarship. One strand claims that resistance to
chattel servitudes was ill-considered in its heyday and is anachronistic
today, and that exhaustion should be revisited in light of this critique.
The second strand of scholarship claims that resistance to chattel servi-
tudes reflected legitimate policy concerns that should continue to shape
exhaustion doctrine today, and even that exhaustion itself is an evolving
common law doctrine. The third, most recent strand argues that exhaus-
tion does not reflect a common law tradition at all but is rather an inde-
pendent doctrine defined and influenced only by the IP statutes them-
selves. I conclude with my own arguments about the continued relevance
of the policy lessons of personal property servitudes to the future of ex-
1. John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellec-
tual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2016).
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haustion, and about how exhaustion might transcend its common law
origins, leading courts to resist remote control over books even if they
enforce remote control over doorstops.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REMOTE-CONTROL PROPERTY
Start by considering a classic passage from Justice Holmes's 1908
concurrence in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,2 in
which he considers that nature of copyright as a property right:
The notion of property starts, I suppose, from confirmed possession
of a tangible object, and consists in the right to exclude others from
interference with the more or less free doing with it as one wills. But
in copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The
right to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned,
but is in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the spontaneity of men where,
but for it, there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as
they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or
tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand
miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware of the
wrong. It is a right which could not be recognized or endured for
more than a limited time and therefore, I may remark, in passing, it is
one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as
the authorities now agree.3
In drawing the contrast between copyright and paradigmatic posses-
sory property rights in tangible objects, Justice Holmes emphasizes the
non-possessory, "in vacuo" nature of copyright.4 Copyright owners can
control strangers from afar, unconnected to any object possessed by the
copyright owner. Copyright owners are thus unlike owners of possessory
fee simple interests in land, whose rights to exclude generally impact the
limited universe of people who come into contact with the physical
boundaries of the owner's parcel.
Justice Holmes alludes to another apparent copyright anomaly: alt-
hough copyright owners are not necessarily possessors, the people whose
spontaneity is restrained by copyright are typically in possession of tan-
gible objects-books, sheet music, or other manifestations of the copy-
righted work.5 As to these tangible objects, copyright operates not as an
instrument of freedom from interference for the possessor, but rather the
opposite: an instrument of restraint wielded by strangers-copyright
owners-via remote control. Copyright thus strikes Justice Holmes as an
odd sort of property right in that instead of liberating people to use their
2. 209 U.S. 1 (1908), superseded by statute, Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90
Stat. 2541, 2541-42 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
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possessions "[i]t restrains [their] spontaneity . . . where, but for it, there
would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit." 6
Copyright owners' power to control how remote strangers use ob-
jects in their possession is not as extraordinary as this passage suggests,
however. Of course copyright shares this characteristic with patent and
trademark. Beyond IP, copyrights are similar in this regard to a whole set
of remote-control property interests that give their owners the right to
control use of assets possessed by other people.7 Servitudes are the most
prominent example.
A servitude, which can take the form of an easement, real covenant,
or equitable servitude, is a non-possessory property interest that gives
its holder the right to use an asset-typically land-in specified ways, or
to object to specified uses of it, or to insist on specified behavior con-
nected to it. The asset is encumbered by the servitude, such that the ser-
vitude's burdens "run[] with" the asset, "pass[ing] automatically to suc-
cessive owners or occupiers."9 Unlike a mere contractual agreement to
refrain from operating a gas station in a residential neighborhood, for
example, a servitude is enforceable against successors in interest.i0
Therefore, if you grant your neighbor an effective servitude, she will be
able to enforce the restriction against you and subsequent owners of your
land. The benefit of a servitude connected to land typically runs to suc-
cessors as well-from your neighbor to the next owner of her house." As
Carol Rose puts it, "[t]he greatest overall advantage of servitudes is that
they give stability to property arrangements over both time and space."'2
The stability that servitudes produce can be especially valuable for
land-use planning. Land is, of course, immobile and enduring. It is often
important for people who invest in land to be able to predict how sur-
rounding land will be used far into the future in order to make invest-
ments that will coordinate rather than conflict, with adjacent activities.13
6. Id.
7. See generally Gerald Komgold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property
Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 TEX. L. REv. 533 passim (1988).
8. The Restatement simplifies this traditional three-part classification into two: affirmative
easements and covenants running with the land (the latter category including servitudes that had
traditionally been classified as negative easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 1.1-14 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
9. Id § 1.1(1)(a).
10. Id. §5.1.
11. Id
12. Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 296-97 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
13. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 407 (2002)
("[T]he spatial fixity of individual parcels of real property causes the value of those parcels to be
necessarily dependent on the uses made of neighboring parcels."); Henry Hansmann & Marina
Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 95, 101 (1997) (noting "the potentially large advantages in coordinating the uses of
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In recognition of these benefits, courts have long enforced land ser-
vitudes and some other varieties of remote-control property rights. None-
theless, Justice Holmes's contention that property rights with such fea-
tures could only be the product of statute rings somewhat true. Judges
have greeted most non-possessory property rights with suspicion and
hemmed them in with doctrinal limitations.14 Reviewing some of this
history and doctrine can help us to understand the challenges posed by
intellectual property law's remote-control property rights, as well as the
origins of the exhaustion doctrine as a limitation on that remote-control.
A. The Evolution ofLand Servitudes
The land-use planning needs of the Industrial Revolution triggered
the development of modem Anglo-American servitude law.'5 Increased
urban density and the potential for conflicts between neighboring proper-
ty owners prompted a variety of attempts to coordinate land uses through
durable private arrangements.'6 Nineteenth century English courts react-
ed with ambivalence, however, establishing a complicated scheme of
servitude classifications and accompanying doctrinal limitations.17
Servitudes came to be classified into the three major categories of
easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, with each category
subject to convoluted rules limiting formation, subject matter, and en-
forceability.'8 As I describe in prior work,' 9 tracing the evolution of
modem servitude law reveals several rationales for this type of hostility
and the limiting doctrines that it produced. I have organized these ration-
ales into three broad categories: those related to notice and information
costs; those related to dead-hand control and other aspects of the "prob-
lem of the future";20 and those related to harmful externalities.21
parcels of property that are, by their nature, bound in a spatial relationship to each other regardless of
their separate ownership").
14. See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 891-
924 (2008) (documenting pervasive skepticism).
15. Easements existed in Roman law and running covenants were recognized as early as
Spencer's Case, (1583 KB) 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, in 1583, but "[u]ntil the Industrial Revolu-
tion greatly increased the use of servitudes, the common law did not develop a general theory of
easements or servitudes." Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of
Property Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1988); see also Uriel Reichman, Toward a
Unified Concept ofServitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (1982).
16. See, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 262 (2d ed. 1986); French,
supra note 15, at 1214; James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1, 13.
17. Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 891-905.
18. See generally Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261 (1982) (reviewing the rules governing the three types of
servitudes).
19. See the introductory note for a list of my previous scholarship.
20. 1 borrow this useful terminology from Julia Mahoney. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Re-
strictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
21. Carol Rose offers a similar but not identical categorization identifying the concerns as
involving information or notice, renegotiability, and value (including third party effects). Rose,
supra note 12, at 298-305.
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B. Notice and Information Costs
Servitudes, like other remote-control property rights, raise special
concerns about notice and information costs. Consider the counter-
factual: if the person in possession of land necessarily had all rights to
control its use, then it would be easy for someone else acquiring posses-
sion from that person to understand exactly what they were getting.22
Where, by contrast, the law recognizes servitudes that allow one person
to own and possess the land while someone else has the right to control
its use, the newcomer who acquires possession does not automatically
know what use rights he has acquired. If servitudes could be imposed to
benefit strangers without any doctrines promoting or requiring notice to
people acquiring the burdened land, then transfers of possession would
be plagued by confusion and/or costly investigation to discover hidden
encumbrances. In Keppell v. Bailey,23 one of the seminal nineteenth cen
24tury English servitude cases, Lord Brougham famously expressed his
concern about this possibility.
[G]reat detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties
were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real
property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar
character, which should follow them into all hands, however emote.
Every close, every messuage, might thus be held in a several fashion;
and it would hardly be possible to know what rights the acquisition
of any parcel conferred, or what obligations it imposed.25
This kind of hostility toward the rude surprise of remote-control
property runs throughout the law and scholarship on servitudes. Courts
and commentators agree that servitudes should not generally bind pur-
chasers who acquire land with no notice of the encumbrance and no rea-
sonable opportunity to acquire notice.
The importance of notice is, accordingly, often identified as a ra-
26tionale for the common law's limitations on servitudes. For example,
the "touch and concern" doctrine requires that servitudes have some con-
nection to the land that hey burden, and, typically, to a neighboring ben-
efited parcel. The doctrine thus helps to ensure that servitudes will be
relatively easy to discover upon physical inspection, and that the owner
22. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 384-85 (describing "the rule of
possession" and observing that "[t]he advantages of this system are obvious. It is easy to understand,
cheap to administer, and generally unambiguous").
23. Keppell v. Bailey (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042.
24. See Rose, supra note 12, at 298 & n.7 (citing Keppell as an example of "nineteenth centu-
ry judges sharply criticiz[ing servitudes] for stirring confusion about and tying up real estate").
25. Keppell, 39 Eng. Rep. at 1049. Keppell was superseded to some extent by the landmark
case of Tulk v. Moxhay discussed below. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143.
26. See, e.g., French, supra note 15, at 1283-86; see also Rose, supra note 12, at 299.
957
DENVER LAW REVIEW
of the beneficial interest will be relatively easy to identify and locate.27
By limiting the subject matter of servitudes, the doctrine also shapes and
reinforces expectations in a way that limits surprise.28 In their influential
work explaining the role of property standardization in limiting infor-
mation costs, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith point to the touch and
concern requirement as an example of a doctrinal technique that stand-
ardizes servitudes and limits the information costs they impose.29
Other doctrines that emerged from the seminal nineteenth century
English servitudes case law, including the requirements of appurtenance
and horizontal privity, similarly limited servitudes to those that were
relatively easy to discover.30 When the landmark decision of Tulk v.
Moxhay eliminated the horizontal privity requirement for equitable
servitudes, it did so only in cases in which there was actual notice.32
Recording acts, which provide for public recording of interests in
land and protect bona fide purchasers from some unrecorded encum-
brances, represent another notice-facilitating mechanism.33 There was no
comprehensive recording system in England when the seminal nineteenth
century servitude cases were decided.34 There were, however, recording
systems in every U.S. state.35 One might, therefore, have expected courts
in the United States to take a more accommodating and less convoluted
approach to servitudes. To the contrary, they initially adopted the English
categories and many of the corresponding doctrinal limitations. Most of
the limitations made their way into the first Restatement of Property3 6 in
1944 and subsequent case law, despite fierce opposition by those who
saw them as anachronistic solutions to a notice problem that no longer
existed in the United States, if it ever did.37
Criticism of the law's complexity and needless hostility toward cer-
tain types of servitudes persisted. Over the course of the twentieth centu-
27. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 402 ("Servitudes that meet this
[touch and concern] requirement are much easier to verify by physical inspection of the property and
its surroundings . . . .").
28. See generally French, supra note 18, at 1290.
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i  the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (2000).
30. See generally Rose, supra note 12, at 299-301; Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 893-95.
31. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 775.
32. Id. at 1144 ("[T]he question is ... whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a
manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he pur-
chased.").
33. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Land Recording and Copyright Reform, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1497, 1502-03 (2013).
34. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 888 (8th ed. 2014).
35. Id.
36. RESTATEMENT OF PROP. (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
37. Regarding horizontal privity, see CHARLES EDWARD CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND
OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 117 (2d ed. 1947). See also Lawrence Berger, A
Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 193-95 (1970). On
the persistence of limitations in U.S. servitude law "notwithstanding persistent criticism from the
academic community," see Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 16-17.
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ry, courts in the United States gradually relaxed some of the most con-
troversial limitations.38 This evolution was reflected, and perhaps out-
paced, by the 2000 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, which
abandoned the horizontal privity requirement, "touch and concern," and
all limitations on benefits held in gross.39 Restatement Reporter Susan
French explained in advance of the project that alternative mechanisms
for providing notice justified eliminating unnecessary rules: "Servitudes
law may be simplified substantially because particular rules designed to
give notice are no longer needed. The modern technology of record sys-
tems and title search procedures, together with the protection recording
acts afford, have made these rules superfluous."
This evolution of servitude doctrine demonstrates, first, that remote-
control property comes with special notice and information costs; and,
second, that those costs can be addressed with a number of different
mechanisms. Subject matter limitations like touch and concern are one
mechanism, actual notice requirements as in Tulk are another, and re-
cording systems are a third. As we will see when we turn to personal
property, the comparative availability of these mechanisms differs across
the types of resources that might be burdened by remote-control property
rights, and so does the intensity of concerns about notice and information
cost problems.
C. The Problem of the Future
Assuring adequate and meaningful notice and minimizing infor-
mation costs are not the only justifications for standardizing property
rights and restricting servitudes. There is another constellation of con-
cerns for which I have borrowed Julia Mahoney's useful term: "the prob-
lem of the future."41 Within this constellation, I include a number of re-
lated issues regarding the extent to which enforcement of servitudes un-
desirably limits the freedom of future generations to manage resources
38. See Rose, supra note 12, at 301; Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 906, 908.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.4, 2.6, 3.2, ch. 2, intro. note, ch. 3,
intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
40. French, supra note 15, at 1225; see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of
Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358 (1982) ("[Wlith notice secured by
recordation, freedom of contract should control."); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 407
("[T]he registries developed for verifying ownership of land . .. [avoid] many of the additional
system and nonuser costs that effective verification of these rights would otherwise require."); Mer-
rill & Smith, supra note 29, at 40 ("[R]ecording acts . . . lower[] the costs of notice [and are] an
alternative method of lowering information costs."). On recording acts generally, see RICHARD R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.01 (2005) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc. 2015). On marketable title acts, see id. § 82.04.
41. Mahoney, supra note 20; see also Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servi-
tudes, and the Problem of the Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2523 (2006); cf Merrill & Smith,
supra note 29, at 4-7 (surveying the literature and observing that "[t]he primary candidate for an
economic explanation [of the numerus clausus principle] has been the suggestion that the numerus
clausus is a device for minimizing the effects of durable property interests on those dealing with
assets in the future").
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wisely and autonomously.42 The theme is excessive control by one gen-
eration over the freedom and flexibility of the next. The specific con-
cerns are that excessive control will limit autonomy and recreate feudal
incidents, impose inefficient land-use choices, and threaten freedom of
alienation. These problems arise not only from manipulation of property
rights by an earlier generation but also from the transaction costs that
make that manipulation difficult to undo. In her classification of con-
cerns about servitudes, Carol Rose groups many of the same problems
under the heading "renegotiability.A3
One feature of servitudes that contributes to these concerns about
the future is the aforementioned remoteness between burdened and bene-
fited parties who may be complete strangers, a remoteness that can con-
tribute to the difficulty of renegotiating an obsolete servitude. Another
important servitude feature that underlies the problem of the future is
durability. Unlike a living party to a contract, a parcel of land that carries
its terms with it can interact with generations of people over time, in-
creasing the likelihood that unforeseen circumstances will render those
terms obsolete." The problem of the future is further compounded when
a servitude arises in a context of rapid and unpredictable change, making
unforeseen obsolescence especially likely.45
Concerns about the problem of the future resonate with the larger
jurisprudence and literature on dead-hand control- in the law of property.
A classic statement on dead-hand control comes from Lewis Simes, who
argued in his lectures on Public Policy and the Dead Hand that "[i]t is
socially desirable that the wealth of the world be controlled by its living
members and not by the dead."" Simes went on to quote Thomas Jeffer-
son, who insisted in a letter to James Madison that "[t]he earth belongs
always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what pro-
ceeds from it, as they please during their usufruct."47
This preference for the living over the dead is often justified in
terms of autonomy and contrasted with feudal serfdom.4 According to
42. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 112-19 (1993) (discussing
ways in which restraints on alienation and servitudes may "enhance[] or inhibit[] freedom or person-
hood systematically and over time").
43. Rose, supra note 12, at 301-03.
44. See Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956,
958-59 (1988); see also Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449,
1489 (2004) ("A restriction on the use (or sale) of Blackacre can limit the use of a valuable resource
for a very long time.").
45. Cf Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion ofPerpetuity and the Preservation ofPrivately Owned
Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 573, 583-84 (2004).
46. LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 59 (1955).
47. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)).
48. As Uriel Reichman puts it in his discussion of servitudes, "Private property is sanctioned
by society not only to promote efficiency, but also to safeguard individual freedom. Servitudes are a
kind of private legislation affecting a line of future owners. Limiting such 'legislative pow-
ers' . . . eliminates the possibility of creating modem variations of feudal serfdom." Reichman, supra
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this view, controlling people who are distant in time and space-not fam-
ily members or contractual privies-is a power associated with govern-
ment or with undesirable feudal hierarchy. Such control should not be
unilaterally imposed by private parties merely on the basis of their prop-
erty ownership and informed only by their "whim and caprice."4 9
The concern with dead-hand control is also often discussed in utili-
tarian terms: the land-use choices of previous generations may turn out to
be inefficient ones in light of changed circumstances.50 The mechanism
by which dead-hand control limits autonomy or efficiency requires fur-
ther explanation where voluntary termination of servitudes is allowed by
law-as it typically, but not always, is.51 The potential problem is that
transaction costs may block a negotiated solution, even when all affected
parties would, in theory, agree to extinguish the unwanted servitude. The
current holders of the servitude's beneficial interest may be difficult to
identify and locate, and they may be so numerous as to make contact and.
negotiation infeasible. Defenders of limitations on servitudes often point
to this specter of transaction-cost-insulated servitudes as a justification
for policies that either constrain the subject matter of servitudes or enable
judges to terminate the detrimental ones.52
Inefficient but transaction-cost-insulated servitudes represent a spe-
cies of the anti-commons problem described by Michael Heller with re-
gard to fragmentation of property interests more generally. Servitudes
divide rights in a single parcel of land among multiple owners. If it is
later desirable to consolidate those rights in order to put the resource to.
its best use, fragmentation of the property bundle, and the transaction
costs involved in re-bundling, can make consolidation difficult. Heller
cites restrictions on servitudes among "numerous restraints [that] limit an
individual's capacity to break up property bundles too much."54
note 15, at 1233. For a skeptical view, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1258 (1985). See also Gregory S. Alexan-
der, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law ofServitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 890-92 (1988).
49. Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 290 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1982).
50. Mahoney, supra note 20, at 744; see also Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation
Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 433, 457 (1984) ("The market response of a future property owner to the future needs of socie-
ty is likely to be more effective than a past owner's fixed blueprint.").
51. In some states, statutes make it difficult to terminate a conservation easement even if the
easement holder agrees. But usually conservation easements, like other types of servitudes, can be
voluntarily extinguished by negotiation with the holder of the non-possessory interest. See generally
ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 195-
96 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 15, at 1233.
53. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, I11 HARV. L. REv. 621, 660-67 (1998).
54. Id. at 664. See generally Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of
Property Rights: A Functional Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS
1, 18-23 (2003); Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 626-29 (2002).
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Heller's concern with fragmentation offers an interesting way to
think about the classic but under-theorized concern with restraints on
alienation, which is also often cited as a rationale for limiting servi-
tudes.55 Many legal mechanisms that are criticized for restraining aliena-
tion do not, in fact, directly restrain transfer. They merely limit the rights
that can be acquired from any single owner. So a subsequent user who
wants to reassemble property rights into a useful bundle must tackle the
transaction costs involved in multiple negotiations. Often the problem is
not so much restraint on alienation as restraint on acquisition: every indi-
vidual stick in the property can be sold; the difficulty is in buying a bun-
dle that is useful to own.
These various concerns associated with the problem of the future
have long motivated common-law restrictions on servitudes.56 And con-
temporary property theorists point to them to justify a variety of doc-
trines that serve to standardize and consolidate property rights.57
As with the problem of notice, however, multiple mechanisms could
be employed to address the problem of the future. The view adopted by
the current Restatement is that concerns with the future are best ad-
dressed in the future by marketable title acts and by doctrines that allow
judicial modification or termination of obsolete servitudes instead of
through doctrines that limit servitude subject matter ex ante." The Re-
statement uses the availability of these alternative approaches to justify
discarding the common law rules, like touch and concern, that addressed
the problem of the future indirectly.59
Although the mechanisms used to address the issue have shifted
over time, it is clear that the problem of the future is a recurring justifica-
tion for servitude skepticism. As with the problems of notice and infor-
mation costs, it is a problem that is endemic to durable remote-control
property rights but one that can be alleviated using a variety of doctrinal
techniques.
D. Externalities
A final set of problems often associated with servitudes involves
their impact on third parties. Restrictions that run with land can impose
55. On the role of restraints on alienation as a rationale for the law's general tendency to
standardize property rights, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 24. Merrill and Smith also note
the connection to fragmentation, arguing that the theory that the numerus clausus is "a doctrine
designed to prevent undue restraints on alienation ... implicitly rests on concern about fragmenta-
tion." Id. at 52.
56. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 904.
57. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 15, at 1232-33.
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significant and harmful externalities.0 Both the problem of the future
and the problem of notice can be understood, at least in part, as externali-
ty problems. Inadequate or costly information about the nature of proper-
ty rights in a specific parcel of land can produce confusion about proper-
ty rights more generally. When one landowner's parcel is burdened by a
strange and confusing covenant, the rest of the neighborhood's residents
may become concerned and confused about the nature of their own
rights. They bear an information-cost externality, to use Merrill and
Smith's terminology.6 1 Similarly, the costs imposed by servitudes that
will burden future generations in unpredictable ways may not be ac-
counted for in today's land transactions.
There are additional categories of externalities that have generated
servitude skepticism. A servitude that prohibits land from being used in a
way that subjects a neighboring business to competition, for example,
may harm third-party competitors and consumers.62 A racially-restrictive..
covenant may harm third parties who suffer its discriminatory impact.63
The third-party effects of servitudes are likely to be especially pro-
nounced-compared, for example, to the third-party effects of bilateral
contracts imposing similar estrictions-because of the features of re-
moteness and durability. Servitudes can reach out over time and space in
a way that tends, in general, to expand their impact and to intensify the
externality problem.64
In addition to its other functions, the touch and concern requirement
has sometimes seemed like a catch-all, doctrinal hook used by courts to
weed out servitudes that impose harmful externalities.65 The Restatement
opts to address such harms more directly, by invalidating those servi-
tudes that "violate public policy" because, for example, they are "arbi-
trary, spiteful, or capricious," or "unreasonably burden[] a fundamental
60. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 617 (1985).
61. Merrill & Smith, supra note 29, at 8-9 ("The existence of unusual property rights increas-
es the cost of processing information about all property rights. Those creating or transferring idio-
syncratic property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs
fully into account, making them a true externality.").
62. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 60, at 622; cf Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass.
1885) (using the touch and concern doctrine to invalidate running covenant against competition),
overruled by Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243, 246-49 (Mass. 1979). See gener-
ally Susan F. French, Can Covenants Not to Sue, Covenants Against Competition and Spite Cove-
nants Run with Land? Comparing Results Under the Touch or Concern Doctrine and the Restate-
ment Third, Property (Servitudes), 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 267, 280-90 (2003) (reviewing
two cases concerning whether covenants against competition run with the land).
63. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
64. Contracts that happen to affect many third parties might trigger the same level of concern.
Cf Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 917 (1988); Merrill
& Smith, supra note 29, at 57.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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constitutional right," or "impose[] an unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition."66
As we will see, the externality problem is one that features promi-
nently in the analysis of whether, and how the law of servitudes, and its
limiting doctrines, should be applied outside of the land context.
E. Personal Property Servitudes
The gradual erosion of traditional limitations on land servitudes can
be explained in part by the development of alternative methods for ensur-
ing notice, by the adoption of ex-post solutions to the problem of the
future, and by the replacement of vague requirements like touch and con-
cern with more focused doctrines addressing specific types of harmful
externalities caused by certain types of servitudes. During the course of
this evolution, property owners, commentators, and occasionally courts
have raised the question whether property doctrines that increasingly
accommodated land servitudes could also be applied to enforce running
restrictions attached to items of personal property.
English equity courts initially extended the equitable servitude rea-
soning of Tulk to personal property, holding in De Mattos v. Gibson,67 in
1859, that the principle applied "alike . . . to movable and immovable
property."68 But in the early twentieth century, English courts stepped
back from this position, holding instead, in Taddy & Co. v. Sterious &
Co., that a manufacturer's resale conditions attached to product packages
"do not run with goods, and cannot be imposed upon them. Subsequent
purchasers, therefore, do not take subject to any conditions which the
Court can enforce."69
In several early twentieth century cases, U.S. courts similarly re-
fused to enforce running restrictions that imposed resale conditions on
chattels. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman70 involved a manufacturer
of unpatented medicine who attempted to fix retail prices by only selling
to wholesalers who agreed to sell only to approved retailers who had
agreed to the manufacturer's minimum prices. The defendant, a retailer
66. Id.
67. (1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 108.
68. Id. at 110; see also SIMPSON, supra note 16, at 259; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 953-54 (1928); Andrew Tettenborn, Covenants,
Privity ofContract, and the Purchaser ofPersonal Property, 41 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 58, 58-59 (1982).
69. [1904] 1 Ch 354 at 358 (Eng). In a subsequent case, Lord Justice Vaughan Williams
declared Taddy "perfectly right." McGruther v. Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306, 309 (Eng.). Lord Justice
Romer elaborated that
A vendor cannot ... by printing the so-called condition upon some part of the goods or
on the case containing them, say that every subsequent purchaser of the goods is bound to
comply with the condition, so that if he does not comply with the condition he can be
sued by the original vendor. That is clearly wrong. You cannot in that way make condi-
tions run with goods.
Id. at 311.
70. 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
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who was not on the manufacturer's approved list, nonetheless managed
to acquire a supply of the medicine, which it sold for less than the mini-
mum price despite having knowledge of the minimum price regime.71
The manufacturer apparently cited De Mattos "to support the notion that
a covenant may attach to chattels which pass by delivery from hand to
hand and bring any one who buys with notice under the restrictions
against a resale at less than a dictated price."72 Judge-later Justice-
Lurton rejected that proposition instead citing contrary cases, including
Taddy, and declared sweepingly that:
It is . . . a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting
the use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to
follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of no-
tice. A covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run
with or attach to a mere chattel.73
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,74 the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the enforceability of a similar price-fixing
scheme, explaining that "[t]he basis of the argument appears to be that,
as the manufacturer may make and sell, or not, as he chooses, he may
affix conditions as to the use of the article or as to the prices at which
purchasers may dispose of it." 75 Like its predecessors, the Court rejected
this chattel servitude logic: "Whatever right the manufacturer may have
to project his control beyond his own sales must depend not upon an
inherent power incident to production and original ownership, but upon
agreement." 76
These and similar cases are the bases for the conventional wisdom
among academic ommentators that chattel servitudes, while not unheard
of, are much less likely to be enforced than land servitudes.77 Commenta-
tors are less uniform in their assessment of whether, and if so why, this
should be the case.
Contemporary scholarship about personal property servitudes owes
a debt to two foundational articles by Zechariah Chafee.7 ' In 1928,
Chafee provided a comprehensive analysis of the topic in Equitable Ser-
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 40.
73. Id. at 39.
74. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007).
75. Id. at 404.
76. Id at 405.
77. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 407 (noting that the law "makes it much sim-
pler to establish partial rights in real property than in personal property"); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 29, at 18 ("[A]lthough the case law is rather thin, it... appears that one cannot create servi-
tudes in personal property.").
78. See Chaffee, supra note 68; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250 (1956).
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vitudes on Chattels.79 The article surveys the case law, based on which
Chafee observed that "[i]n view of these decisions it might well be main-
tained that the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels has been effec-
tively killed by the courts . . . ."80 But Chafee found the courts' reasoning
conclusory and unpersuasive.8 i Further, he observed that most of the
cases involved restrictions that restrained trade in one way or another by,
for example, fixing prices, tying goods, or dividing territories-leaving
open the question of the validity of restrictions not subject to that objec-
tion.82 In the meantime, manufactures continued to attempt to impose
restrictions, suggesting a live question.83 So Chafee went on to consider
and evaluate normative arguments in favor and against enforcing chattel
servitudes.84
I will describe some of Chafee's specific arguments below. For
now, suffice it to say that he found servitudes attached to personal prop-
erty more likely to be costly and less likely to be necessary than land
servitudes.85 Although he was unwilling to condemn chattel servitudes
across the board, he put the burden on anyone seeking to enforce a run-
ning restriction on a chattel to show that theirs was a special case in
which the benefits outweighed the costs, or that something in the busi-
ness or legal environment had changed so dramatically as to make chattel
servitudes desirable in general.86 Chafee did not think that the time for
enforceable chattel servitudes had come, as a general matter, in 1928, nor
when he revisited the question in 1956.87
Some contemporary commentators argue that the time for chattel
servitudes has now come. Referring to Chafee's 1928 article and his
1956 second thoughts, Glen Robinson argues in his 2004 article Personal
Property Servitudes that: "Nearly a half century later, there is reason to
entertain third thoughts on the matter despite the general disposition of
79. Chafee, supra note 68.
80. Id. at 955.
81. For example, as to the oft-recited policy in favor of free alienation, Chafee observed that
restraints on the alienation of land "were also regarded as objectionable at common law" and yet
cases like Tulk v. Moxhay enforced use restrictions that made land less alienable as a practical mat-
ter. Id. at 982-83. So "[]ust as modem needs have brought equitable restrictions on land, of which
the old common law knew nothing, into existence, they may also call for a limited departure from
the free transfer of chattels for the sake of promoting desirable business practices wholly strange to
Coke's day." Id.
82. Id. at 1007 ("In many situations where manufacturers have endeavored to employ this
device, the courts have refused to allow them to do so because it would unreasonably restrain trade.
However, it seems possible that restrictions on the area and the form of resale may not always be
open to such an objection.").
83. Id. at 956 ("[T]he wide prevalence of these restrictions in business practice indicates that
they embody a strong and definite commercial policy which, despite its previous checkered career,
may eventually succeed in obtaining judicial recognition, perhaps with legislative aid.").
84. Id. at 960-1013.
85. Id. at 1011-13.
86. Id. at 1013.
87. Chafee, supra note 78, at 1263-64.
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courts and commentators to be content with Chafee's judgment."" Rob-
inson suggests that personal property servitudes should be enforceable as
a general matter, with any concerns about restrictions featuring anti-
competitive terms left to be addressed by antitrust law, now more mature
than it was when the early twentieth century chattel servitude cases were
decided.89
In 2007, I took up the question myself, arguing-contra Robinson-
that judicial skepticism is justified by a somewhat different mix of the
concerns with notice and information costs, dead-hand control over the
future, and externalities that motivated skepticism of land servitudes.9
This renewed interest in chattel servitudes is due in part to the his-
torical, doctrinal, and theoretical connections with current controversies
about the scope of IP exhaustion, as the next section explains.
II. SERVITUDES AND THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY EXHAUSTION
In the midst of early twentieth century cases questioning the en-
forceability of chattel servitudes as a general matter, several cases arose
that posed an added complication: the chattels in question embodied
copyrighted works or patented inventions. Against the backdrop of courts
refusing to enforce servitudes on ordinary chattels, IP owners argued that
their exclusive rights should give them extra power to control down-
stream resale and use of the embodiments of their intangible property.
The seminal case taking up this question in the copyright context
was Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,91 in which a book publisher attempted
to enforce this restriction printed inside books: "The price of this book at
retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright."92
The Second Circuit understood this as an "attempt of an owner of
an ordinary chattel to impose by contract restrictions upon its use or sale
binding upon third parties, and which, it is claimed, may operate as a sort
of ambulatory covenant annexed to the chattel."93 The court rejected that
attempt, albeit rather timidly in light of the conflicting case law it cited
on the topic, including both De Mattos and Taddy & Co.94
But the plaintiff in Bobbs-Merrill did not rely exclusively on the
equitable servitude notion from De Mattos. It also argued that, as the
88. Robinson, supra note 44, at 1451.
89. Id. at 1494-1515.
90. Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 949.
91. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (Bobbs-Merrill 1), 147 F. 15 (2d Cir. 1906), affd, 210 U.S.
339 (1908).
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 24.
94. Id. at 25-28.
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copyright holder, it had an exclusive right to "vend" the copyrighted
work embodied in its books.95 By distributing books subject to restrictive
terms, it was granting purchasers only a conditional license to exercise
that vending right; vending outside the terms of that license-that is,
selling books for less than one dollar-therefore amounted to copyright
infringement.9 6 The Copyright Act, according to this logic, provides a
mechanism for imposing running restrictions on chattels that the com-
mon law lacks. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed.97
On this point, both Bobbs-Merrill opinions purport merely to inter-
pret the language of the Copyright Act, concluding that the right to vend
granted in the Act is exhausted as to a given copy of a copyrighted work
once that copy is sold.98 But the reasonableness of that interpretation
gains strength from the notion that to interpret the right to vend beyond
the first sale would do violence to the common law.9 For example, the
Supreme Court's opinion notes with apparent alarm:
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell
the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reserva-
tion of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infring-
er because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the pur-
chaser sells at a price fixed in the notice.ioo
The Court refused to interpret the Copyright Act to include such a
right.o'0 Although-unlike the Second Circuit-it did not cite Taddy &
Co. or any other cases addressing chattel servitudes, the Court's narrow
interpretation of the vending right suggests an undercurrent of hostility
toward running restrictions on chattels that made it difficult to persuade
the Court that Congress intended to part ways with the common law.' 02
Of course, the statutory rights granted to copyright holders super-
sede the hostility to running restrictions to some extent: there are some
95. Id at 17.
96. Id
97. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (Bobbs-Merrill l), 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908).
98. See id. at 350 ("It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without re-
striction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it."); Bobbs-Merrill 1, 147 F. at 22 ("If the
statutory owner desires after publication to control the lawfully published copies, such control can
only be secured by means of positive contract or conditions . . . .").
99. Cf Bobbs-Merrill 1, 147 F. at 20 ("The law of copyright also gives privileges to authors
and publishers that do not pertain to property which anybody may make and sell if he can; but even
under the law of copyright, when the owner of a copyright and of a particular copy of a book to
which it pertains, has parted with all his title to the book, and has conferred an absolute title to it
upon a purchaser, he cannot restrict the right of alienation, which is one of the incidents of owner-
ship in personal property." (quoting Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co., 61 N.E. 219, 220 (Mass. 1901)));
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1248-49 (2001).
100. Bobbs-Merrill II, 210 U.S. at 351.
101. See id
102. See id See generally Robinson, supra note 44, at 1464-81 (describing links between the
first sale doctrine and common law principles).
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things that the owner of a copyright-embodying chattel is not permitted
to do with it-for example, reproduce each of its pages-on account of
the non-possessory intellectual property rights created by copyright. But
Bobbs-Merrill and, later, the statutory codification of the "first sale" doc-
trine,103 articulates one limit on even a copyright holder's power to im-
pose running restrictions on personal property.
In the patent context, the Supreme Court initially accepted the idea
that a patent owner's right to control "use" of a chattel embodying his
invention could be leveraged into the type of running restriction that
would not be enforced on a non-patented article. In Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co.,'0o the Court held that a patent owner could use an express, condi-
tional license to impose a running restriction on a chattel embodying a
patented invention against a purchaser with notice;'05 specifically, the
Court enforced a restriction stamped on a mimeograph machine that said:
"This machine is sold by the A.B. Dick Company, with the license re-
striction that it may be used only with the stencil, paper, ink, and other
supplies made by A.B. Dick Company."'0
Justice Lurton, who had rejected the notion of a use restriction "an-
nexed to a chattel" in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman,i0 7 explained that
the patent law, unlike the common law of personal property'0 and unlike
copyright, separates ownership of a chattel from the right to use that
chattel, and that the right to use can be granted conditionally so as to
allow use subject to running restrictions. 109 The opinion suggested that
other restrictions, even resale price-fixing restrictions of the type rejected
in Dr. Miles and Bobbs-Merrill, could be enforced via an express re-
striction imposed by a patent holder against a chattel owner with no-
tice."i0 Indeed, Justice Lurton cited an English case,"' Incandescent Gas
Light Co. v. Cantelo,112 which held that a patentee's restrictive terms
were enforceable with notice and that "[i]t does not matter how unrea-
sonable or how absurd the conditions are."ll3
But the distinction that Justice Lurton drew between common law
chattel servitudes and running restrictions imposed via patent law on the
use of chattels embodying patented inventions was short-lived. One year
later, the Court refused to enforce express retail price limitations printed
103. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
104. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
105. Id. at 24-25.
106. Id. at 25-26.
107. 153 F. 24 (1907).
108. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 18-19.
109. Id. at 44-45.
110. See id. at 26.
111. Id. at 40.
112. (1895) 12 Rep. Pat. Cas. 262 (QB) (UK).
113. Id. at 264.
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on packaging for patented medicine in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.114 The
Court confirmed the Bauer result in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine
Co."1 5 refusing to enforce price restrictions attached to patented record
players. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufactur-
ing Co.," 7 the Court expressly overruled A.B. Dick, refusing to enforce a
trying restriction imposed via a label on a movie projector."
1 8
My claim here is not that these seminal cases establishing the doc-
trines of copyright and patent exhaustion were mere application of a
common law prohibition on chattel servitudes. They were primarily ex-
ercises in statutory interpretation, determining the meaning of the exclu-
sive rights to vend copies of copyrighted works and to use and sell arti-
cles embodying patented inventions. But these exercises in statutory in-
terpretation were conducted in the shadow of the common law hostility
to chattel servitudes, which made the question of statutory interpretation
partly whether Congress had spoken clearly enough to invade what
would otherwise be the province of the common law and to validate a
legal mechanism that the common law had rejected."19
III. CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES
The contemporary commentary on personal property servitudes has
been motivated in part by controversies about the scope of IP exhaustion,
with its historical and doctrinal connection to the servitude case law.
Among the most pressing questions is whether exhaustion is a default
rule that IP owners can avoid merely by attaching restrictive labels to
objects embodying their IP, or by characterizing distribution of those
objects as "licenses" rather than sales.120 The commentators who address
this and related questions come to dramatically different conclusions
about the implications of the chattel-servitude connection.121
114. 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913).
115. 243 U.S. 490 (1917).
116. Id. at 501 (concluding that he case fell "within the principles of" Bauer, 229 U.S. at 16,
and Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873)).
117. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
118. Id. at 518-19; see also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., No. 89 C 4524, 1990 WL
19535, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1990), rev'd, 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
119. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the
common law . .. are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."); cf Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1353 (2013) ("'[W]hen a statute covers an issue previous-
ly governed by the common law,' it is presumed that 'Congress intended to retain the substance of
the common law."' (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 329 n.13 (2010))).
120. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (holding that patent exhaustion is defeated by a clearly communicated single use/no-resale
restriction); id. at 778 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("The patent exhaustion doctrine . . . admits of no excep-
tion.").
121. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, Glen Robinson finds arguments against enforce-
ment of chattel servitudes unpersuasive.122 He contends that the doctrinal
prohibition should be abandoned and that chattel servitudes should be
enforced much as land servitudes are.123 Because Robinson sees IP ex-
haustion as sharing the same origins and logic as the ban on chattel servi-
tudes, he suggests that exhaustion should not operate to invalidate IP-
owner-imposed restrictions on use and resale, which should generally be
enforceable with both IP and state law remedies.124
In their work on copyright exhaustion, Aaron Perzanowski and Ja-
son Schultz also emphasize the common law origins of the IP exhaustion
concept, but their origin story is somewhat different.125 They point not
only to the common law's general hostility to chattel servitudes126 but
also to common law reasoning within copyright itself: cases preceding
the seminal chattel-servitude decisions in which judges permitted down-
stream owners of copyrighted works to do a variety of things without the
authority of copyright owners.127 They argue that the justifications moti-
vating this common law reasoning should continue to shape the law of
copyright exhaustion in the courts, even beyond the codification of copy-
right first sale as a specific limitation on the rights of distribution and
display.128 In addition, Perzanowski and Schultz harness the common law
rationales for exhaustion to resist attempts by copyright owners to avoid
exhaustion by re-characterizing sales as licenses.12 9 Beyond that, they
argue that the user privileges associated with exhaustion should some-
times extend beyond owners of tangible copies in a digital age in which
such copies are increasingly irrelevant.130
In a recent contribution to this debate, John Duffy and Richard
Hynes make a break with those who trace the origins of exhaustion to the
common law of either chattel servitudes or IP.13' They argue instead that
the doctrine is exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation.132 Its only
connection to the law of chattel servitudes is as a "boundary doctrine"
122. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Robinson, supra note 44.
124. See id at 1505 (approving of the result in Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 1086, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2000), which held that the doctrine of first sale did not apply to a
software licensing agreement that granted end users with a right to use the software but did not
transfer title).
125. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV.
889 (2011).
126. Id. at 910-11.
127. See id at 910-12.
128. Id. at 912-18.
129. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1221-22 (2015).
130. Id. at 1256 ("Copy ownership, as currently construed by courts in software cases, is no
longer a useful benchmark for identifying the relationship between the consumer and the work that
triggers exhaustion.").




that prevents IP law from interfering more than Congress intended with
generally applicable commercial law.1 33 As to the substance of that
commercial law, Duffy and Hynes point out that distributors of chattels,
including chattels embodying IP, can in fact impose running restrictions
by complying with the Uniform Commercial Code's rules governing
secured transactions.'34 They argue that IP owners should also be able to
seek contractual, but not IP, remedies against users who violate terms
attached to IP embodiments.'13 This is not to say, however, that exhaus-
tion lacks teeth. Duffy and Hynes point out that the notice and other for-
mal requirements of these bodies of state law are more onerous, and the
remedies less generous, than those of IP.'36
My own view is that the information costs, problems of the future,
and externalities that long motivated doctrinal restrictions on land servi-
tudes are all the more relevant to both chattel servitudes and IP. Consider
notice and information costs, including the costs involved in identifying
and locating servitude beneficiaries for the purposes of renegotiating.37
Notice and information costs are minimized for land servitudes by re-
cording systems, but no comprehensive recording system exists for chat-
tels outside of the secured transactions context. And recording of IP is
notoriously imperfect. When IP owners are permitted to impose running
restrictions notwithstanding exhaustion, the ultimate recipient of the bur-
dened object may be remote in time and place, with little hope of identi-
fying and communicating with the current owner of the IP right for pur-
poses of renegotiating the restriction once it becomes obsolete. This is, of
course, a problem that plagues remote-control IP rights generally, includ-
ing the core rights of reproducing copies of copyrighted works and mak-
ing patented inventions. But at least with regard to the generally inex-
haustible rights of reproduction and making, there is a strong case that
the benefits gained by the remote-control property rights outweigh the
costs imposed, as where land servitudes are enforced to serve important
land-use planning goals. That is the basic logic of IP protection: the in-
centive effect relies on IP owners controlling the proliferation of embod-
iments that might compete in the marketplace with their authorized em-
bodiments.'3 That type of control limits the ruinous competition that
could make it impossible for at least some creators and inventors to gar-
ner returns on their investments. It is much less clear that adequate incen-
133. Id. at 36.
134. Id. at 60-64.
135. Id. at 8-9, 58-60.
136. Id. at 58-64 (discussing contract remedies and security interest notice requirements).
137. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Technology and Tracing Costs: Lessons from Real Prop-
erty, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 385 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,
2013). Guy Rub also emphasizes these costs in his recent work on copyright exhaustion. Guy A.
Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 788-89 (2015).
138. Cf Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 125, at 915 ("Of course, title to a copy cannot
confer on its owner an unbounded privilege to reproduce the work. Complete exhaustion of the
reproduction right would undermine the incentive structure at the heart of copyright law.").
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tives depend on IP owners' ability to control downstream use and trans-
fer of authorized embodiments.13 9
Furthermore, remote-control IP prompts concerns apart from those
related to notice and information costs. There is a special version of the
problem of the future that looms large here. The health of the intellectual
property system relies on a rich public domain, which depends in part on
the expiration of IP rights after "limited times." But the public domain
will not fuel future creativity and innovation if the works destined for the
public domain do not survive the period of exclusive rights. If TP owners
could exercise continued remote control over all manifestations of their
works and inventions, that control could curtail the ability of others to
preserve those works for future generations.
Perhaps most importantly, access to, preservation of, and autono-
mous enjoyment of works of IP generate spillover benefits for third par-
ties. If exhaustion could easily be evaded by private ordering, it would
effectively impose negative externalities on those beneficiaries of the IP
system.
So, to me, the argument for exhaustion stems in part from the costs
that are imposed by chattel servitudes generally, in part from costs spe-
cific to the IP context, and in part from the lack of justification for endur-
ing those costs, except in the limited circumstances in which creators'
and inventors' incentives would be undermined in a way that inhibits
progress in science and the useful arts."4 The proper reach of the exhaus-
tion doctrine is thus a question for IP policy-in Congress and the
courts-not for IP owners unilaterally deciding that exhaustion should
not apply to them, either by unilaterally placing post-sale conditions, re-
characterizing sales as licenses, or imposing nominally contractual re-
strictions that are so adhesive and ubiquitous that they function like
property rights. 14 Exhaustion should be subject to relaxation only if in-
formation costs problems are addressed.142 Even then, there should be a
screen, akin to the touch and concern requirement, 143 that would help
139. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013) ("[T]he Constitu-
tion's language nowhere suggests that its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide
markets or a concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say
to increase or to maximize gain."). See generally Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Eco-
nomics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. REv. 55, 57-60.
140. Cf Katz, supra note 139, at 99-100 ("[T]he marginal benefit from having enforceable
restraints diminishes as we move along the vectors of distance and time. At the same time, the mar-
ginal social costs associated with goods encumbered by restraints could easily increase over distance
and time because any use inconsistent with the restraint would require the IP owners' permission, yet
the cost of obtaining such permission could easily increase over time and distance.").
141. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 14, at 934-35. But see Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v.
Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that clearly communicated post-
sale restrictions may be enforced under patent law).
142. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 137.
143. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property




ensure that running restrictions on objects embodying IP promote pro-
gress rather than imposing negative externalities. These negative exter-
nalities could include waste of physical resources, destruction of cultural
heritage, and diminution of opportunities for innovation and expres-
sion.'" If running restrictions promote progress, but only in the short
term, or only when enforced against intermediaries but not end-users,
then they should be subject to durational limits or a changed circum-
stances doctrine designed to address the problem of the future.145
CONCLUSION
IP exhaustion should be understood against the backdrop of a long
history of skepticism toward what I call remote-control property rights.
Where IP owners try to exercise remote control over uses and transfers
that do not cut to the core of their need to limit ruinous competition, ex-
haustion can step in to maintain IP's balance between remote-control
property's benefits and costs. These costs and benefits are not just a mat-
ter of concern to IP owners and users: like the costs associated with per-
sonal property servitudes, they have implications for a property system
that is beset by high information costs, for future generations burdened
by obsolete restrictions, and for third parties harmed by other externali-
ties.
Although looking to the law of tangible property helps us to recog-
nize these costs, we should also keep in mind their unique character in
the IP context. Restrictions on the use of works of creativity and inven-
tion have implications for the promotion of progress of science and the
useful arts. Therefore, they should not be ratcheted up solely at the whim
of IP owners attaching labels to embodiments of their works. Nor should
they be left solely to generally applicable commercial law without regard
to IP's special policy concerns. Instead, courts and Congress hould con-
tinue to absorb the wisdom of the common law of tangible property
while crafting an IP-specific exhaustion policy that is attentive to the
specific costs and benefits of remote-control IP.
144. Katz, supra note 139, at 109-17.
145. I touch on the possibility of a changed circumstances doctrine for copyright, imported
from tangible property law, in Molly S. Van Houweling, Disciplining the Dead Hand of Copyright:
Durational Limits on Remote Control Property, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2016).
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